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TAXATION OF PROMISES TO PAY*
PATRICIA A. CAiN**
Deferred payment sales of property may create varying types of
tax liability for individual sellers. In this Article, Ms. Cain reviews
the different methods available for reporting gain on such a transac-
tion with particular emphasis on the valuation of promises to pay
received by the seller. Both the timing for reporting gain and the
amount of gain a seller is required to report are important elements
and both are dependent on the concept of "fair market value. " Ms.
Cain analyzes the tax consequences of deferred payment sales in
relation to both cash and accrual basis taxpayers and suggests that
the differential treatment which has evolved is a product of judicial
misinterpretation of the tax law.
T HE taxation of promises to pay is a particularly difficult area
in the federal income tax scheme. Most of the difficulties
arise in the area of deferred payment sales of property.' That is,
instead of receiving cash in a sales transaction, the seller may re-
ceive a promise from the purchaser that the cash will be paid at
some future date.
This promise may be made in many forms. It may be uncondi-
tional or it may be dependent upon the happening of some future
event. It may consist of a promise to make installment payments
over a period of time or to make a lump sum payment on a certain
date. The form of the promise will affect the manner in which the
sales transaction is taxed. It may determine whether the transaction
is immediately taxable or it may determine the amount of the tax.
Another factor besides the form of the promise which must be
considered is the method of tax accounting employed by the seller.
In many cases accrual basis taxpayers are treated differently from
cash basis taxpayers.
The purpose of this Article is threefold. First, there are factors
which relate to the form of the promise and to the factual situation
* This Article is based on an address delivered by James 0. Hewitt, member of firm of
Hewitt & Shaw, San Diego, California, at the annual proceedings of the Southern Federal
Tax Institute in September, 1972. An outline of this address may be found at 7th So. FED.
TAX INsT., B-1 (1972).
** Associate, Johnson, Thorington, North, Haskell & Slaughter, Montgomery, Alabama.
B.A., Vassar College, 1968; J.D., University of Georgia, 1973.
1 Problems may arise in other areas as well; e.g., receipt of a promise to pay for services
rendered.
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surrounding the sales transaction. These factors and their effect on
taxation of the transaction 2 will be fully discussed. Second, the dif-
ferences in treatment between cash and accrual basis taxpayers will
be analyzed. Finally, it will be suggesteed that these differences are,
in some cases, inappropriate.
I. METHODS FOR REPORTING GAIN ON DEFERRED PAYMENT SALES
Generally, recognition of gain on the sale of property falls within
the purview of section 1001 of the Internal Revenue Code.' Section
1001(a) defines gain as the excess of the "amount realized" on the
sale over the adjusted basis of the property. Section 1001(b) defines
"amount realized" as the sum of any money received plus the fair
market value of any "property (other than money)" received. Prom-
ises to pay fall within the category of "property (other than
money)." 4 Thus the receipt of a promise to pay produces taxable
gain to the extent that the fair market value of the promise received
exceeds the adjusted basis of the property sold. 5
When a taxpayer sells property and receives a deferred payment
obligation from the purchaser, there are three recognized methods
which may be employed to report any gain. Which is the correct
method depends on the facts of each transaction. The mechanics of
these methods is discussed below.
A. The Closed Transaction Method
Under the "closed" approach, the seller recognizes his entire
gain in the year of sale. According to section 1001 the gain is com-
puted by subtracting the adjusted basis of the property from the
total amount realized on the sale in that year. Receipt of obligations
to pay must be included as an amount realized. Although section
1001 itself does not differentiate between cash and accrual basis
taxpayers, the courts have made such a distinction.
A cash basis taxpayer is only required to include the promise to
pay as an amount realized to the extent of its fair market value.7 If
the promise to pay is valued at less than face, the taxpayer will have
I These factors may determine whether the gain is immediately taxed and they may affect
determination of the amount of the gain to be taxed.
Ir~'r. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 1001.
Treas. Reg. § 1.453-6(a)(1) (1958).
Accrual basis taxpayers, however, normally value the promise at face. See note 10 infra.
E.g., First Savings & Loan Ass'n, 40 T.C. 474 (1963). See text accompanying notes 132-
34 infra.
Treas. Reg. § 1.1001-1 (1957). See note 12 infra.
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to report the difference as discount income as he collects payments
on the obligations. For example, taxpayer A (employing the cash
method) sells property in which he has an adjusted basis of $50 to
B. B pays for the property by giving A a promissory note in the face
amount of $300, to be paid in yearly installments of $100 each. If
the note is determined to have a present fair market value of only
$240, 8 then A will report a gain in the year of sale in the amount of
$190 (fair market value of the notes less adjusted basis). His basis
in the note is then $240. As each $100 payment is received, A will
treat 240/300ths as return of basis and 60/300ths as discount income
which is taxed at the ordinary rate.
Under the general principles of accrual accounting on the other
hand, a closed transaction for the accrual basis taxpayer arises when
his right to receive a specific amount becomes fixed.9 Although sec-
tion 1001 speaks in terms of fair market value, the accrual basis
taxpayer will normally accrue the face amount of the buyer's obliga-
tions.'0
B. Open Transaction Method
The "open" method allows postponement of recognition of gain
until the taxpayer has recovered all of his basis in the property
sold." It is available when the obligations received are incapable of
being valued' 2 in the year of sale, and consequently, where the trans-
Whether or not a promise to pay is assigned a fair market value of less than face depends
on the presence or absence of the factors discussed in Section I1.
Spring City Foundry Co. v. Commissioner, 292 U.S. 182 (1934).
See text accompanying notes 110-20 infra.
" Treas. Reg. § 1.453-6(a)(2) (1958). See INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 1001.
,2 Open treatment is allowed if "the obligations received by the vendor have no fair market
value ... " Treas. Reg. § 1.453-6(a)(2) (1958). The term "no fair market value" means no
ascertainable fair market value in contrast to zero fair market value. In theory, there are three
possibilities as to fair market value: (1) the fair market value is unascertainable, giving rise
to "open" tax treatment; (2) the fair market value is ascertainable and is greater than zero,
giving rise to "closed" treatment, and (3) the fair market value is ascertainable, and is equal
to zero, giving rise to "closed" treatment. It is possible that use of the phrase "no fair market
value" has given rise to confusion. An obligation with "no fair market value" might be
interpreted by one court to mean no ascertainable value and by another court to mean zero
fair market value. See Note, Taxation of Vendors of Real Property: The Concept of Fair
Market Value, 15 STAN. L. Ray. 85, 88 (1962). Notes which lack market value because they
are worthless are notes which have zero fair market value. An example of a transaction
involving a promise to pay that has zero fair market value is the following: Purchaser gives
seller an unsecured promissory note in the amount of one million dollars immediately before
the purchaser is discharged in bankruptcy. The promisor's available assets are sufficient to
pay off only part of his secured indebtedness and none of his unsecured indebtedness. In this
extreme example, the unsecured promise to pay would have a zero fair market value, and
1973]
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action cannot be "closed" for tax purposes. The underlying reason
for allowing a taxpayer such treatment is that there are factors
surrounding the transaction which make any present computation
of gain merely speculative. Since it is uncertain whether the tax-
payer will realize any gain at all-or if any, how much gain he will
realize-he is allowed to leave the computation of gain "open" for
tax purposes. Once he has recovered his basis, any further payments
he receives will be reported in full as gain.
It is immediately apparent that availability of the "open" method
will affect the time at which gain must be reported. Since payments
are first applied toward basis, a taxpayer reporting on this method
may defer recognition of gain to some future taxable year. However,
there is a further reason why this method is beneficial to the tax-
payer. The character of the gain which is eventually reported is
determined by the nature of the original transaction. Thus if the
sale were of a capital asset, all future payments that are reported
as gain will be taxed at the capital gains rate. 3
Obligations are normally incapable of valuation when payment of
the obligation is subject to a significant contingency. The contin-
gency may take the form of-(1) a contingency which affects the
ultimate amount that the buyer is obligated to pay;" (2) a contin-
gency which affects the probability that the obligation will in fact
be paid;1 5 or (3) a contingency which affects the time that the
buyer's obligation will become due." There are two distinct types
of sales transactions in which these contingencies may be present:
1. Sale of property for an indeterminate sales price.-This type
of transaction will always involve a contingency of the first type. It
may, of course, involve either of the latter two contingencies as well.
The obligations received by the seller will have no face amount;
rather the amount payable will be expressed in such terms as a
percentage of profits. Although the percentage may be fixed, it will
always be a percentage of an unknown amount." Obviously since
the transaction would be treated as "closed" for tax purposes.
In contrast, "open" treatment would be allowed where the amount of the purchase price is
subject to sufficient contingencies to render the fair market value unascertainable, See notes
14-18, 76-99 and accompanying text infra.
" See Commissioner v. Carter, 170 F.2d 911 (2d Cir. 1948).
" For example, a promise to pay 5 per cent of Company A's net profit for the coming year.
For example, a promise to pay only if Company A makes a profit for the year.
For example, an unconditional promise to pay when A dies. Since A's death is a cer-
tainty, there is no factor affecting the probability of payment in this example. The time of
payment is the only uncertainty.
" See Burnet v. Logan, 283 U.S. 404 (1931).
[Vol. 8: 125
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the sales price is not ascertainable, neither is the amount of gain
realized on the transaction. Such a transaction is properly classified
as "open" and should normally be given "open" treatment for tax
purposes"5 regardless of the method of accounting employed by the
taxpayer.
2. Sale of property for a fixed sales price.-This type of transac-
tion should always be classified as "closed." However, it is possible
for a "closed" transaction to qualify for "open" tax treatment if it
involves a sufficiently contingent promise to pay." This variety of
transaction will necessarily involve only the latter two contingen-
cies-probability of payment and time of payment-since the ulti-
mate amount of the obligation is fixed by the sales price. Since such
a transaction is properly classified as "closed" and yet given "open"
tax treatment because of the attendant contingencies, it might be
more accurate to describe such a transaction as "ajar."
C. The Installment Method
This method is elective and is equally available for cash and
accrual basis taxpayers provided they meet the requisites of section
453.21 Since the availability of this method is expressly governed by
statute, it does not present the type of difficulties surrounding the
"open" and "closed" methods. Basically, this method allows a seller
" In some cases, however, a transaction properly classified as "open" may be given
"closed" treatment for tax purposes, if it is possible to predict with any degree of certainty
the probable amount that will eventually be paid to the seller. See notes 85-88 and accompa.
nying text infra. Indeed, Regulation 1.453-6(a)(2) states that "[ojnly in rare and extraordi-
nary cases does property have no fair market value"-the prerequisite to "open" treatment.
This language indicates the strong tendency of the Service to favor "closed" treatment and
disfavor "open" treatment.
" See notes 91-99 and accompanying text infra.
" Theoretically it would be possible for such a transaction, although originally classified
as "open," to be subsequently classified as "closed." For example, at the beginning of year
one it may be impossible to assign a fair market value to a promise contingent upon Company
A's making a profit if at that time the company's projected earnings picture is highly specula-
tive. However, if six months into the year the company is doing so well that a projected year-
end profit is practically certain, the promise may acquire a fair market value at that time
even though the contingency still exists and even though payment is not yet due. There do
not appear to be any cases on this point, but logically such a situation could exist. Once the
speculation caused by the contingency is removed, there would be nothing to prevent the
ascertainment of the promise's fair market value.
21 INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 453. To use this method, the seller must not receive payments
in the year of sale which exceed 30 per cent of the sales price. Also, the sale must be at a
price exceeding $1,000. A complete discussion of the installment method is beyond the scope
of this Article. For further information on installment reporting, see Ginsberg, Capital Asset
Transactions-Casual Sale for Future Payments, 5th So. FED. TAx INsr. S-1 (1970).
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to report income as he receives payments on the obligations. The
gain on the sale is determined in the year the sales transaction is
completed.2 2 The ratio of this gain to the total contract price is the
percentage of each installment payment which must be reported as
income. Thus if a seller realizes a gain of $10x on a total contract
price of $100x, he must recognize as income ten per cent of each
payment in the year in which it is actually paid. The other ninety
per cent of each payment represents a return of basis. When pay-
ments have been received in full, the seller will have recognized his
entire gain of $10x.
As noted, the differences in treatment between cash and accrual
basis taxpayers usually involve application of either the "open"
method or the "closed" method. A partial basis for this differential
treatment has evolved from judicial interpretations of section 100123
and its predecessors. The presence or the ascertainability of a "fair
market value" 4 has been determinative of whether "open" treat-
ment was available in a particular transaction. The "fair market
value" standard for determining whether there is immediate gain
and the extent of that gain is a concept that has developed primarily
in transactions involving cash basis taxpayers. Therefore, it is in the
context of cash basis accounting that the development of the stan-
dard will be analyzed.
II. CASH BASIS TAXPAYERS
As a general rule, a cash basis taxpayer must recognize gain when
he receives, or constructively receives, cash or its equivalent .2 Both
the doctrine of constructive receipt and the doctrine of cash equiva-
lency were early recognized as exceptions to the original rule that a
cash basis taxpayer must report gain only when he receives cash.2 1
Treas. Reg. § 1.453-1(b) (1958) speaks in terms of gross profit rather than gain and
provides that gross profit shall be the selling price less adjusted basis. Apparently both cash
and accrual basis taxpayers would compute their gross profit on the basis of face amount with
no consideration of fair market value. The obligations may, however, be subject to the im-
puted interest regulations. Treas. Reg. § 1.483-1 (1966).
2' See note 6, supra.
21 "[Flair market value of other property received." INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 1001.
Treas. Reg. 1.446-1(c)(1)(i) (1957).
2, The doctrine of constructive receipt does not apply to the receipt of promises to make
deferred payments in lieu of immediate cash. Thus it is beyond the scope of this Article.
Rather, constructive receipt is applicable in situations in which the seller has an immediate,
rather than a a future, right to cash and he merely turns his back on that right attempting
to defer receipt. For a further analysis of the doctrine, see Sehlossberg, "Cash Equivalent"
[Vol. 8: 125
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In the area of deferred payment sales the doctrine of cash equiva-
lency has come to be replaced by the "fair market value" standard
which is now codified in section 1001.
A. Birth of the Fair Market Value Standard
The original provision for determining gain on sales of property
required that property received "be treated as the equivalent of cash
to the amount of its fair market value, if any. . . ."2 This language
seems to presume that all sales of property will result in immediate
taxation. Since the statute dictates that cash equivalency treatment
be given to all property received by the seller, seemingly with no
necessity for any initial determination of whether the property is in
fact the equivalent of cash or whether it does in fact possess a fair
market value, its literal application would result in "closed" treat-
ment for all sales by cash basis taxpayers, regardless of the nature
of the property received.2s Partly due to the confusion this language
created,'9 the section was altered in 1921 to provide that "no gain
or loss shall be recognized unless the property received in exchange
has a readily realizable market value .... "I'
This language clearly negates the presumption of immediate rec-
ognition of gain. The emphasis on "readily realizable market value"
implies that the property must be capable of being immediately
converted into cash. This section was changed as early as 1924 to
read in the same language as the present section 1001 31-"[t]he
amount realized. . . shall be the sum of any money received plus
the fair market value of the property (other than money) re-
and "Constructive Receipt"-How These Doctrines Bring Immediate Taxation, 22 J. TAx.
18 (1965).
Revenue Act of February 24, 1919, ch. 18, § 202(b), 40 Stat. 1060.
But see Reg. 45 (1920 ed.) Art. 1563:
Gain or loss arising from the acquisition and subsequent disposition of property is
realized when as the result of a transaction between the owner and another person the
property is converted into cash or into property (a) that is essentially different from
the property disposed of, and (b) that has a market value. In other words, both (a) a
change in substance and not merely in form, and (b) a change into the equivalent of
cash, are required to complete or close a transaction from which income may be
realized.
This language appears to require an initial finding of cash equivalency. It also appears to
equate fair market value with cash equivalency, thus contributing to the confusion in this
area.
H.R. REP. No. 350, 67th Cong., 1st Sess. (1921).
:o Revenue Act of November 23, 1921, ch. 136, § 202(c), 42 Stat. 230.
3, Revenue Act of June 2, 1924, ch. 234, § 202(c), 43 Stat. 256.
1973]
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ceived. ' '32 Despite this change in statutory language, courts deciding
cases under the 1924 Act emphasized the convertibility notion, cit-
ing cases decided under the 1921 Act.3 Thus the body of case law
which has developed in this area has tended to create judicial stan-
dards independent of the standard suggested by statute.
Although the change to "fair market value" from the more restric-
tive standard of "readily realizable market value" may be indicative
of congressional intent to equalize tax treatment of cash and accrual
basis taxpayers in deferred payment sales of property,34 some courts
have expressed opposition to the notion of such an equalization."
The reasoning seems to be that since there are provisions which
authorize the use of either accounting method," the two methods
are presumed necessarily to produce distinctively different tax con-
sequences. However, to place such emphasis on accounting methods
is to read something into the Code that is simply not present. No-
where in section 446 nor in the regulations promulgated thereunder
is there any express provision that a particular transaction may not
result in equivalent tax treatment for both types of taxpayers. Fur-
thermore, recognition of gain on sales transactions is explicitly gov-
erned by sections 1001 and 1002. There is no provision that methods
of accounting should have any effect on the literal application of
these sections. Courts which have concerned themselves with mak-
ing such distinctions have created unnecessary confusion by elevat-
ing obsolete notions of cash and accrual basis reporting to a position
2 TNT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 1001(b).
E.g., Dudley T. Humphrey, 32 B.T.A. 280 (1935). This case cites Bedell v. Commissioner,
30 F.2d 622 (2d Cir. 1929) and John B. Atkins, 9 B.T.A. 140 (1927) as authority for a present
determination of no fair market value. Yet both Bedell and Atkins were applying statutes
prior to 1924. Humphrey, on the other hand, involved a 1929 transaction.
One writer, in discussing the same factors presented in this Article, suggests that the result
of this misinterpretation is that the test for cash basis taxpayers has become whether the
deferred payment contract is the equivalent of cash rather than whether there is a fair market
value as section 1001 would seem to indicate. Comment, Realization of Income in Deferred
Payments Sales, 34 Mo. L. REv. 357 (1969). Although it is true that the "cash equivalency"
standard has been overemphasized by some courts, there is a significant trend toward the
more appropriate approach of the "fair market value" standard.
31 See Levin & Javaras, Receipt of Notes and Other Rights to Future Payments by a Cash
Basis Taxpayer, 54 A.B.A.J. 405 (1968).
1 E.g., Harold W. Johnston, 14 T.C. 560 (1950). In Johnston the court indicated that
placing a value on the seller's right to future contract payments and thereby requiring imme-
diate recognition of gain by him would be entirely inconsistent with the principles of cash
basis accounting. To do so would be to tax the seller as though he were an accrual basis
taxpayer.
31 INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 446.
[Vol. 8: 125
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of importance which ignores the significance of the present language
of section 1001.
There is a further possible rationale for the court's continuing
focus on a taxpayer's ability to convert obligations into ready cash.
The underlying theory is that a cash basis taxpayer should not be
required to pay a tax if he is unable to convert the property received
into actual cash. Otherwise he might find himself obligated to the
government when he has no cash in hand with which to satisfy the
obligation.
The "fair market value" standard is based on a different ration-
ale. It seems to be derived from the theory that most promises to
pay have some value. 7 However, for tax purposes there must be
some standard for determining that value which will produce the
degree of objectivity and consistency necessary for a fair application
of the tax laws. "Fair market value" is such a standard. Whereas
the "cash equivalency" rationale tends to overemphasize liquidity-
type factors, the "fair market value" rationale is less concerned with
the taxpayer's actual ability to convert a promise into immediate
cash.
Fair market value is a concept used consistently throughout the
Internal Revenue Code,38 and yet the Code itself offers no precise
definition of the term. 39 Although this concept has a much wider
application, for purposes of this Article only factors relevant to the
fair market value of promises to pay received for property sold will
be considered."
For the cash basis taxpayer, immediate taxable gain results only
if the promise to pay has a fair market value." Although it does not
say so explicitly, section 1001 implies such a result, stating that
determination of gain is based on "the fair market value of the
property (other than money) received." 2 If the property has no fair
market value,4 3 the inference is that section 1001 cannot be ap-
-r A promise to pay may of course have a fair market value equal to zero. This is not to be
confused with a promise having no ascertainable fair market value. See note 12 supra.
u E.g., INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, §§ 301(b)(1), 311(d)(1).
" See Note, supra note 12, at 86.
" For a broader analysis of the concept of fair market value see Gordon, What is Fair
Market Value?, 8 TAx. L. REv. 35 (1952).
11 Irr. Rav. CODE OF 1954 §§ 1001, 1002.
12 INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 1001(b).
11 The phrase "no fair market value" should be interpreted to include no ascertainable fair
market value since both nonexistence of fair market value and non.ascertainability of that
value can result in "open" treatment. See note 12, supra. For example, an obligation has no
19731
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plied.4 Regulation 1.1001-1(a) provides as follows:
The fair market value of property is a question of fact, but only
in rare and extraordinary cases will property be considered to
have no fair market value. 5
The existence and ascertainability of a "fair market value" for
deferred payment obligations will necessitate reporting gain accord-
ing to the "closed" method. On the other hand, if there is no "fair
market value" or if it cannot be accurately ascertained, the tax-
payer will be entitled to report his gain according to the "open"
method.
The responsibility for making the initial determination as to the
existence of fair market value of promises to pay, has been delegated
to the courts. The determination is to be made on an ad hoc basis,
giving full consideration to the facts of each case. 6 Guidelines for
making this determination are the product of general case law in the
area. The rules that have evolved are confusing and at times incon-
sistent. Courts have tended to emphasize different types of factors
in applying the "fair market value" standard of section 1001. The
following Section will analyze these factors and suggest guidelines
for a more consistent approach.
B. Factors Relevant to the Determination of Fair Market Value
Although the "fair market value" standard has been a part of the
Revenue Code since 1924, early cases tended to apply the cash equi-
valency test, which had been a part of the earlier Acts.4" The factors
discussed below should demonstrate the trend towards replacing
"cash equivalency" with "fair market value."
1. Negotiability of the Instrument.-This is one of the liquidity-
type factors so important in the earlier "cash equivalency" determi-
nation. Correspondingly, earlier cases attached great weight to the
fair market value when there is no market for the obligation. It has no ascertainable fair
market value when the amount to be paid is so speculative that it cannot be predicted with
any reasonable degree of accuracy. In the latter case, it might be said that although the
obligation has some market value, it has no fair market value since the value assigned or
offered by the market place would necessarily be speculative.
Treas. Reg. § 1.453-6(a)( 2) (1958) makes it clear that such is the case. If there is no
fair market value, "open" treatment is proper. But "only in rare and extraordinary cases does
property have no fair market value." Id.
Treas. Reg. 1.1001-1(a) (1957).
" Howard H. Perelman, 41 T.C. 234, 242 n.11 (1963).
' See notes 27,30 supra.
[Vol. 8: 125
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negotiable character of instruments in determining whether they
were to be included as an amount realized and, therefore, give rise
to recognition of gain. 8 A nonnegotiable promissory note was con-
sidered to be a mere evidence of indebtedness and not a payment
which represented present gain to a cash basis taxpayer. Conse-
quently gain was not to be reported until actual payment of the
note.49 The same reasoning held true for contractual rights which,
absent negotiability, were not treated as the equivalent of cash.5
The importance attached to negotiability is indicated by the follow-
ing statement by Judge Learned Hand in Bedell v. Commissioner,51
a case which considered whether a nonnegotiable promise to pay
constituted an amount realized:
If a company sells out a plant for a negotiable bond issue pay-
able in the future, the profit may be determined by the present
market value of the bonds. But if land or a chattel is sold and
title passes merely upon a promise to pay money at some future
date, to speak of the promise as property exchanged for the title
appears to us a strained use of language, when calculating prof-
its under the income tax. . . . [lit is absurd to speak of a
promise to pay a sum in the future as having a "market value,"
fair or unfair. Such rights are sold, if at all, only by seeking out
a purchaser and higgling [sic] with him on a basis of the
particular transaction. Even if we could treat the case as an
exchange of property, the profit would be realized only when
the promise was performed.5 2
The above language implies that this court recognized "fair market
value" as the appropriate standard. As Judge Hand indicated in his
opinion, the promise could have been sold had the holder found a
purchaser. That is, there were no restrictions on assignability. Ab-
sent the factor of negotiability, however, the court refused to find
that a fair market value existed for the promise to pay. Hence there
was no present recognition of gain.
Such decisions appear to ignore the Treasury's position stated as
See, e.g., Commissioner v. Garber, 50 F.2d 588, 591 (9th Cir. 1931).
See Dudley T. Humphrey, 32 B.T.A. 280 (1935).
See, e.g., Harold W. Johnston, 14 T.C. 560 (1950). In Nina J. Ennis, 17 T.C. 465 (1951),
the Tax Court found that "[it is true that the contract possessed many elements of a
mortgage. ., but this characteristic does not lend to the contract the necessary element of
negotiability." Id. at 470.
30 F.2d 622 (2d Cir. 1929).
Id. at 624.
19731
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early as 1928 in GCM 3350,3 where a distinction was made between
negotiability and marketability in land installment contracts un-
supported by notes. The GCM stated, "[t]hese [land installment]
contracts are transferrable by assignment; are freely pledged, sold,
or otherwise dealt in; are not in any respect conditional; and have
a fair market value which is readily ascertainable.""
The initial case to specifically reject negotiability as the determi-
native test for cash equivalency was Cowden v. Commissioner.5 In
1951 the taxpayers leased a portion of their land to Stanolind Oil
and Gas Company, and at that time the company contracted to
make "advance royalty" payments to the taxpayers, with one pay-
ment due in 1952 and one in 1953. In 1952, the taxpayers assigned
the contract right to receive the 1953 payment to a local bank at a
nominal discount, and reported a gain on the transaction at that
time. The Commissioner contended that the company's obligations
to pay resulted in income reportable in 1951-the year in which the
taxpayers received them. The taxpayer took the position that there
could be no "equivalency of cash" since the obligations to pay were
not evidenced by negotiable instruments. The Fifth Circuit rejected
the taxpayers' argument as being "as unrealistic as it is formalis-
tic."5 The court then added the following comment:
We are convinced that if a promise to pay of a solvent obligor
is unconditional and assignable, not subject to set-offs, and is
of a kind that is frequently transferred to lenders or investors
at a discount not substantially greater than the general prevail-
ing premium for the use of money, such promise is the equiva-
lent of cash and taxable in like manner as cash would have
VII-1 CUM. BULL. 62 (1928).
' Id. at 63. More recent cases, however, have been willing to find "fair market value"
absent negotiability. For example, in Phillips v. Frank, 295 F.2d 629 (9th Cir. 1961), the Ninth
Circuit held that the previous distinction between the negotiability of notes and the nonnego.
tiable character of rights in contracts for the sale of land was "illusory" with respect to the
question of whether the latter is to be treated as an amount realized. See also Joan E. Holler
Trust, 24 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 1663 (1965), where it was stated: "The question is not...
whether the contracts are negotiable instruments but whether, under the facts on record, we
can determine a fair market value for these contracts. ... Id. at 1669, rev'd 382 F.2d 675
(9th Cir. 1967). However, in Guffey v. United States, 222 F. Supp. 461 (D. Ore. 1963), a/I'd,
339 F.2d 759 (9th Cir. 1964), the district court without mention of Phillips v. Frank concluded
that a contract for the purchase of land was not a cash equivalent, since they are not freely
traded and are ordinarily sold only at substantial discounts.
289 F.2d 20 (5th Cir. 1961).
Id. at 24.
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been taxable had it been received by the taxpayer rather than
the obligation."
The Cowden court seems to be applying "cash equivalency" as the
appropriate standard. All of the factors mentioned above clearly
indicate that the taxpayer could, without great difficulty, convert
the promise into immediate cash.
Although Cowden does reject negotiability as the determinative
factor for present recognition, courts have not relied upon this deci-
sion for the proposition that negotiability is never the determinative
factor. The essence of the holding is that receipt of unsecured, un-
conditional and nonnegotiable promises of a solvent debtor to make
future payments results in taxable gain. However, the holding
should probably be limited to the particular set of facts involved.
That is, there were a substantial number of other relevant factors
which were present in Cowden: (a) the solvency of the obligor; "  (b)
the unconditional and assignable aspects of the promise;" and (c)
the transferability of the promise at a reasonable discount.w The
presence of these factors was sufficient to negate the importance of
the lack of negotiability. However, in simple executory contracts to
make future payments unsupported by notes, mortgages or other
evidences of indebtedness, the contract rights are generally not val-
ued and are viewed merely as accounts payable by the buyer and
accounts receivable by the seller." In the absence of the Cowden
factors listed above this is generally the proper method to account
for such contracts.2 Thus it is now generally accepted under both
the "cash equivalency" and "fair market value" standards, that
receipt of a promise to pay constitutes taxable income to the cash
basis taxpayer if it is capable of being readily converted into cash.
Lack of negotiability no longer stands as an independent ground for
deferral of taxation.
Id.
Id. It should be pointed out that solvency of the obligor is also an important factor in
determining the fair market value of a negotiable instrument. See Emanuel E. Falk, 36 T.C.
292 (1961) and text accompanying notes 91-96 infra.
289 F.2d at 24.
f6 Id.
6" See Harold W. Johnston, 14 T.C. 560 (1950); William J. Wineberg, 20 CCH Tax Ct.
Mem. 1715 (1961), aff'd, 326 F.2d 157 (9th Cir. 1963).
12 However, an open account or even a mere oral promise to pay, although not to be
regarded as income under the doctrine of cash equivalency, may be found to be constructively
received if the amount is shown to have been available to the taxpayer. See John B. Atkins,
9 B.T.A. 140 (1927), affd, 36 F.2d 611 (D.C. Cir. 1929).
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2. Transferability and Assignability.-Transferability and as-
signability are two further liquidity-type factors. The degree of
transferability and assignability that must exist before a taxpayer
is required to recognize gain may differ depending on which stan-
dard the court chooses to apply. For instance, the Treasury has
stated that contractual rights must be "freely transferable and read-
ily saleable" before an obligor's promise can be considered the
equivalent of cash.63 However, minimum restrictions on assignabil-
ity will not necessarily justify nonrecognition, especially if the "fair
market value" standard is applied. In Levine v. Commissioner,4 for
example, the restriction on assignment for a maximum period of one
year, to be released earlier if examination of the seller's books were
completed, did not prevent purchase money mortgages from being
assigned a fair market value equal to face.
Use of the "cash equivalency" standard obviously makes deferral
of taxation more likely. However, under either standard, the exist-
ence of assignability in form only will probably not be sufficient to
defer recognition of gain. The taxpayer must be able to utilize the
assignable nature of the instrument. Absence of a potential assignee
may be an important factor." Furthermore, it has been specifically
held that if freely assignable notes are held in escrow and the seller
has no right to immediate possession of the notes, then the factor
of free assignability is irrelevant to the determination of immediate
recognition of gain.66
3. Marketability.-The existence of a market place for contrac-
tual rights or obligations unsupported by negotiable notes is gener-
ally held to warrant the conclusion that such rights or obligations
are the equivalent of cash or have an ascertainable fair market
value. Three related concepts have been advanced which aid in
establishing what evidentiary criteria may be presented in deter-
mining whether a market place exists for a specific obligation.
(a) Regular Trading. In Curtis R. Andrews,"7 the taxpayer, upon
the sale of his partnership interest, received contractual rights un-
supported by notes and unsecured. Subsequent to the sale the tax-
" Rev. Rul. 68-606, 1968-2 CUM. BULL. 42.
G, 324 F.2d 298 (3d Cir. 1963).
' See text accompanying notes 67-75 infra.
McLaughlin v. Commissioner, 113 F.2d 611 (7th Cir. 1940). Of course, if the taxpayer
insists on the use of escrow to defer recognition of income, the doctrine of constructive receipt
may require immediate recognition.
-, 23 T.C. 1026 (1955).
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payer had made several fruitless attempts to sell the rights locally.
The controlling factor in the court's determination that the contrac-
tual rights were not cash equivalents was the fact that they were not
of a type "commonly sold.""5
Evidence as to presence or absence of common or regular trading
in the specific type of obligation, then, may be pertinent. The impli-
cation of the Andrews case, due to its particular facts, is that ab-
sence of regular trading in the immediate locality may be sufficient.
However, absence of local regular trading has been deemed insuffi-
cient in at least one case. In C.D. Stratton,69 a promissory note
secured by a second mortgage was received by the taxpayer upon a
corporate liquidation. Nothwithstanding the fact that there were no
institutions located in the taxpayer's hometown, Boise, Idaho,
which engaged in the purchasing of second mortgage notes, the
notes were deemed to have an ascertainable fair market value. It
was possible to ascertain their fair market value, explained the
court, since there were corporations and other institutions in other
western states, particularly California, which engaged in the pur-
chasing of such notes.7 1
(b) The Cowden test. Cowden v. Commissioner7' stated that to
be a cash equivalent a contractual promise must be of a type which
is "frequently transferred to lenders or investors at a discount not
substantially greater than the generally prevailing premium for the
use of money. 7 2 This adds a further element to the concept dis-
cussed above. Once evidence of regular trading is presented it may
be accompanied by evidence as to the amount of discount offered
by the regular traders on the specific type of promise as well as
evidence as to the present standard amount of discount. If the dis-
parity is significant, the Cowden test suggests lack of cash equiva-
lency.
Questions relating to the extent of discount will be discussed in
more detail at the end of this Section and again in Section IV. The
notion is offered here simply as a possible evidentiary factor in an
attempt to establish that there is in fact no market for a particular
Id. at 1035.
, 38 P-H Tax Ct. Rep. & Mem. Dec. 1117 (1969).
o See also Joliet-Norfolk Farm Corp., 8 B.T.A. 824 (1927), acquiesced in, VII-1 Cum. BuLL.
16 (1928) where the court found second mortgage notes to have no fair market value. The
findings of fact indicated the scope of the search for a market place was extended beyond
the taxpayer's hometown.
289 F.2d 20 (5th Cir. 1961).
Id. at 24.
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obligation. Obviously the fact of a substantial discount alone will
normally be insufficient to establish absence of fair market value.
The reasons for the discount must also be analyzed. However, ex-
pert witnesses testifying as to the amount of discount they would
be willing to offer has been considered of probative value by some
courts.73
(c) Readily Marketable and Immediately Convertible. The
third concept is reflected in the following language from the Treas-
ury Department:
Certain evidences of indebtedness are property deemed to be
equivalent of cash, but not all evidences of indebtedness are
property the fair market value of which is includable in the
income of a taxpayer on the cash receipts and disbursements
method of accounting. However, a deferred-payment obliga-
tion which is readily marketable and immediately convertible
to cash is property the fair market value of which is income to
a cash-method taxpayer in the year of receipt to the extent of
that fair market value.
74
The type of evidentiary criteria suggested by this language is
similar to that suggested by the first two concepts. "Readily" and
"immediately" may imply a geographically local market as sug-
gested in Curtis R. Andrews. 75 Both terms suggest a degree of trans-
ferability which approaches negotiability. On the other hand, the
language does not logically require nonrecognition if something less
than negotiability is present. It does, however, emphasize the fact
that it is the current marketability of the obligations which renders
them equivalent to cash. The possibility that a market place may
exist at some time in the future, even if that possibility approaches
certainty, would not be sufficient if evidence were presented to es-
tablish the absence of ready marketability and immediate converti-
bility.
4. Contingencies. 71-Discussion of the first three factors has il-
73 See e.g., Warren Jones Co., 60 T.C. 663 (1973) in which the taxpayer was allowed to defer
recognition of gain under sections 1001 and 1002 because, although the obligation received
could have been sold, it could not have been sold "except for a price discounted by almost
50 percent." Id.
" Rev. Rul. 68-606, 1968-2 Cum. BuL.. 42.
"5 23 T.C. 1026 (1955).
Although other factors such as the obligor's financial status might affect the question of
collectibility, this subsection refers only to express contingencies affecting collectibility, For
example, payment may be expressly contingent upon the happening of a certain event. Other
[Vol. 8: 125
HeinOnline  -- 8 Ga. L. Rev. 140 1973-1974
PROMISES TO PAY
lustrated the modern trend toward finding fair market value for
promises to pay. However, in some cases there are sufficient contin-
gencies which give rise to open rather than closed tax treatment.
The Supreme Court has refused to ascribe a fair market value to an
obligation or promise to pay in the future which is so contingent
upon future ecomonic events and uncertainties as to render any
method of valuation highly speculative. The leading case in this
area is Burnet v. Logan.7
Mrs. Logan owned stock in a company that had certain mining
interests. In 1916 she sold her stock and in the transaction she
received a promise to pay sixty cents per ton of ore mined in the
future. The Commissioner attempted to treat the sale as a closed
transaction by placing a fair market value on the promise. The
taxpayer argued that the promise had no ascertainable fair market
value and that she was entitled to "open" treatment. The Court
agreed with the taxpayer.
Burnet v. Logan involved a contingency which affected the face
amount, since the amount of payment was based on the tonnage of
ore that would be mined in the future. However the case does not
stand for the proposition that a promise to pay an indefinite amount
necessarily has an unascertainable fair market value, as some com-
mentators have suggested.78 "There is nothing inherent in a contract
or claim for the future payment of indefinite amounts that causes
it to be insusceptible of valuation." 79
Thus it would be possible for a transaction involving an indeter-
minate sales price to be taxed according to the "closed" method
even though it were properly classified as an "open" transaction.
"Closed" treatment would be required if the obligation, although
"open" as to face amount, had a readily ascertainable fair market
value. Such would be the case, for example, were the obligation to
state that the amount due would be five per cent of Company A's
yearly profit. If Company A had a fairly uniform history regarding
yearly profits and if such obligations were regularly traded at a fair
value, it would be possible to ascertain the obligation's "fair market
value."
factors merely imply contingencies; payment is impliedly contingent upon the obligor's abil-
ity to pay. Express contingencies may prevent the payment from ever becoming due, whereas
implied contingencies merely operate to prevent payment in a practical sense.
- 283 U.S. 404 (1931).
7' See Note, Taxation of Deferred Payment Sales of Realty and Casual Sales of Personalty,
10 UTAH L. Rxv. 195, 202-03, 215 (1966).
1 John W. Chamberlin, 32 T.C. 1098, 1106 (1959).
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In Burnet v. Logan, however, it was not the "openness" of face
amount alone which required "open" treatment. Rather, the contin-
gency as to face amount was coupled with a particular factual situa-
tion which made the value of the obligation even more speculative.
The relevant facts in Burnet v. Logan were that the amount of ore
available for mining was unknown and that the mining company
was under no obligation to extract any ore at all.80
The rule of Burnet v. Logan has been applied to other types of
contingent payments. In George W. Potter,8' the promise was for a
fixed payment, but it was contingently payable out of future profits
from a mining operation. The court found that the promise had no
ascertainable fair market value in the year of sale because the tax-
payer presented sufficient evidence to show that at best the possibil-
ity of his realizing any gain in the transaction was highly specula-
tive. 2 In Donald C. MacDonald3 payments to the taxpayer were
contingent upon royalties produced under certain patent rights.
Again, the court looked to the particular factual situation and deter-
mined that there was sufficient uncertainty regarding the amount
of gain that the taxpayer might actually realize from the transac-
tion.8 Therefore, "open" treatment was appropriate.
Although promises to pay that are contingent on future profits
have been held to have no ascertainable fair market value,8" there
is an exception to the general rule of Burnet v. Logan. If there are
conditions prevalent in the particular industry concerned that make
future success speculative, that may be sufficient evidence of lack
of present fair market value of any obligations which are contingent
upon such future success.88 But if there is "an established industry
with sufficient criteria for ascertaining fair market value,"87 then a
fair market value may be ascribed in spite of the contingent nature
of the payments.8
42 F.2d at 195-96.
7 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 622 (1948).
" The mine involved had been worked to near exhaustion and evidence as to past profits
was not considered indicative as to future prospects. Id. at 626.
55 T.C. 840 (1971).
11 The court noted that past history of production may be indicative of future production
in some cases. But in the instant case such estimations were complicated by the possibility
of an expanding market and certain threats to production. Id. at 861.
United States v. Yerger, 55"F. Supp. 521 (E.D. Pa. 1944).
Stephen H. Dorsey, 49 T.C. 606 (1968).
Id. at 630.
Exemplary of this renvoi to industry for determination of fair market value are the
following: (1) valuation of royalty rights in the motion picture industry, Pat O'Brien, 25 T.C.
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The Service has attempted to restrict the use of Burnet v. Logan
to prevent the potential of transmuting ordinary income into capital
gains."9 With the trend toward valuation of contingent payment
contracts and with the Treasury's requirement that such contracts
be valued except in "rare and extraordinary cases,"'" the availabil-
ity of the open transaction method is becoming more limited.
5. Obligor's Financial Status.-The financial status of the obli-
gor has, in some instances, been advanced as a factor to be consid-
ered in determining the fair market value of notes or obligations, or
for that matter, determining whether a fair market value can be
ascertained at all. In D.I. Stevenson v. Commissioner," the known
financial weakness of the purchaser under a contract for the sale of
land, as well as the speculative nature of the purchaser's venture
(raising mint commercially in an area where it seemed likely to fail)
led the court to conclude that the selling or pledging of the tax-
payer's contractual rights would be difficult if not impossible.
Under these circumstances, the court refused to make a finding of
cash equivalency.
A more recent case finding the obligor's financial status to be a
factor in ascertaining the existence of a fair market value is Estate
of William F. Stahl.12 In this case, the future payments on promis-
sory notes received on the sale of a patented invention depended
principally on the productive capacity of the invention. This factor,
coupled with a showing of the financial weakness of the obligor, was
sufficient to induce the court to conclude that the fair market value
of the promissory notes was unascertainale.
376 (1955); (2) valuation of contract rights to future payments based upon gross receipts from
the sale of water, Gersten v. Commissioner, 267 F.2d 195 (9th Cir. 1959); (3) valuation of the
rights to future renewal commissions in the insurance industry, Estate of Abraham Gold-
stein, 33 T.C. 1032 (1969). The real estate industry has been instrumental in changing the
characterization of land sales contracts for tax purposes. Early Tax Court decisions con-
sistently found that contracts for the sale of land were not cash equivalents, reasoning
that there was no established market, or that the contract was merely an account receiv-
able. Estate of Wilson Critzer, 13 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 1087 (1954); Nina J. Ennis, 17 T.C.
465 (1951). However, with the development and use of "standard land sales contracts,"
came growing acceptance and marketability in the investment community. Today standard
form land sales contracts are normally readily tradable and, therefore, are includible in
income to the extent of fair market value. Kaufman v. Commissioner, 372 F.2d 789 (4th Cir.
1966).
See generally, Farer, Corporate Liquidations, Transmuting Ordinary Income into Capi-
tal Gains, 75 HARV. L. Rxv. 527 (1962).
Rev. Rul. 58-402, 1958-2 Ci. BuLL. 15.
9 B.T.A. 552 (1927).
52 T.C. 591 (1969), aff'd, 442 F.2d 324 (7th Cir. 1971).
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No case has yet held that a negotiable promissory note would not
be a cash equivalent should the obligor be found to have a weak
financial status. 3 But the court in Cowden v. Commissioner" stated
in dictum that "[a] promissory note, negotiable in form, is not
necessarily the equivalent of cash. Such an instrument may have
been issued by a maker of doubtful solvency . . .[and therefore]
might be denied a ready acceptance in the market place."9 Unfor-
tunately, R.V. Board," on which the Cowden court placed great
reliance, did not indicate whether the note involved was negotiable.
Moreover, no cases were cited where a note, negotiable in form, was
found not to be a cash equivalent due to the financial status of the
maker.
6. Other Factors.-Several other factors have at times been con-
sidered by the courts as relevant to their determination of both the
existence of an ascertainable fair market value and the amount of
that fair market value. For instance, the value of the property secur-
ing a note" as well as the extent to which the security may be
encumbered by senior liens,98 have been determinative factors.
The duration of the outstanding debt may also be relevant in
ascertaining the existence or the amount of the fair market value of
a promise to pay. In Pinellas Ice & Cold Storage Co. v.
Commissioner,"9 the short-term character of the notes was a contrib-
uting factor in support of the Court's finding that the fair market
value of the notes was equal to face.
The Court's emphasis on this factor suggests that the notes' short-
term character was not only relevant in determining the amount of
the fair market value, but also relevant to the initial determination
that there was any fair market value and that, therefore, receipt of
11 Solvency of the obligor is, however, an important factor in determining the fair market
value of such a note. See note 58 supra.
" 289 F.2d 20 (5th Cir. 1961). The Cowden court relied generally on R.V. Board, 18 B.T.A.
650 (1930).
289 F.2d at 24.
18 B.T.A. 650 (1930).
' See, e.g., Walter W. Rose Inv. Co., 24 B.T.A. 215 (1931), acquiesced in, X-2 Cum. BuLL.
61 (1931), where the taxpayer sold an orange grove for cash and notes secured by a first
mortgage on the property. The court in holding that the notes had no fair market value
explained that in the year of the sale there was no demand nor any market for purchase money
notes secured by mortgages on the type of property involved in the case, because of the
existing frost hazard.
" See, e.g., Miller v. United States, 235 F.2d 553 (6th Cir. 1956), where the second mort.
gage notes, being subordinated to first mortgage notes to the extent of 90 per cent of the
appraised value of the property, were held to have no fair market value.
287 U.S. 462 (1933).
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the notes resulted in a recognizable gain. The Court seemed to be
applying the "cash equivalency" standard. The short-term charac-
ter of the notes (all due within four months) was particularly rele-
vant under this analysis, since there is obviously less distinction
between short-term notes and present cash than between present
cash and cash in ten years time. The question arises: Does the long-
term character of an obligation suggest that recognition of gain
should be deferred altogether? The Pinellas case implies that such
might be the case. Assuming the obligation to be transferable, the
long-term character would probably serve merely to reduce the pres-
ent fair market value. The propriety for deferment of gain in such a
situation will be analyzed in Section IV.
All of the above factors should be considered collectively in deter-
mining fair market value in deferred payment sales of property.
Presence or absence of any single factor should not normally be
determinative of the issue of whether the transaction is "closed" for
tax purposes, requiring the taxpayer to recognize immediate gain.
However, absence of most or all of the factors will often make the
transaction "open" for the cash basis taxpayer, thereby allowing
him to defer recognition of gain.
Il. ACCRUAL BASIS TAXPAYERS
A. General Introduction
Prior to 1916 the only authorized method for computing taxable
income was the cash receipts and disbursements method.'1 After
the enactment of section 8(g) of the Act of 1916,'1' however, an
individual was allowed to "make his return upon the basis upon
which his accounts are kept. . . ." The present authority for report-
ing taxable income on the accrual method is found in section 446'02
and the regulations promulgated thereunder. In particular, Regula-
tion 1.446-1(c)(ii) is pertinent:
Generally, under an accrual method, income is to be included
for the taxable year when all events have occurred which fix the
right to receive such income and the amount thereof can be
determined with reasonable accuracy.103
' See United States v. Anderson, 269 U.S. 422, 438 (1926).
10, Act of September 8, 1916 ch. 463, §8(g), 39 Stat. 763.
"1 INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, §446.
'W Treas. Reg. § 1.446-1(c) (ii) (1957).
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Thus the proposition has been established that it is the "right to
receive and not the actual receipt"'' 4 that determines income tax
liability for the accrual basis taxpayer.
There are, of course, exceptions to the general rule that an accrual
basis seller must immediately accrue all obligations received in a
deferred payment sale of property. For example, accrual of the value
of a note may not be required if there is sufficient doubt as to its
collectibility.' °5 Corn Exchange Bank v. United States' is the case
generally cited for this proposition. The taxpayer in Corn Exchange
argued that he should not be required to accrue interest that became
due in a particular taxable year because events in that year made
it fairly certain that the obligor would not be able to pay the amount
due. The court agreed with the taxpayer, reasoning that it would be
unjust to require a taxpayer to pay a tax on an amount that he
would in all probability never receive.
Doubt was cast on this "exception", however, by the Supreme
Court decision in Spring City Foundry Co. v. Commissioner.'
Spring City is the case generally cited for the proposition that it is
the "right to receive and not the actual receipt"'0 8 that is determina-
tive of accrual basis tax liability. The issue in Spring City centered
on whether an account which was due and payable in the year of
sale could be excluded from gross income in view of the fact that
the account was partially uncollectible. The Court determined that
it was proper to include the amount of the account at full face value
since the right to payment had accrued at the time of sale. Any
questions as to uncollectibility were to be resolved through applica-
tion of the appropriate statute governing deductions."' Spring City,
although dealing with an account receivable which had arisen from
the sale of inventory by a merchandiser, has nonethless been cited
Io Spring City Foundry Co. v. Commissioner, 292 U.S. 182, 184-85 (1934).
,05 Clifton Mfg. Co. v. Commissioner, 137 F.2d 290 (4th Cir. 1943); Corn Exch. Bank v.
United States, 37 F.2d 34 (2d Cir. 1930). Although both cases involved the question of
accruing interest, the rationale for nonaccrual is equally applicable in cases involving prom.
ises to pay.
109 37 F.2d 34 (2d Cir. 1930).
,07 292 U.S. 182 (1934).
Id. at 184-85.
' The reason the problem arose in this case was that under the taxing statutes then in
force, deductions were allowed only for totally worthless debts. Since the debt in question
was only partially worthless, the taxpayer argued that the amount should not be included In
gross income to begin with. Such a problem would not arise under current taxing statutes
since a merchandiser would normally avail himself of a deduction based on his reserve for
bad debts. Id.
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as controlling authority for immediate accrual at face value of in-
stallment obligations received in casual sales of non-inventory prop-
erty."10
The rule expounded in Spring City -may appear to overrule Corn
Exchange and cast doubt on the availability of the "uncollect-
ibility" exception. Corn Exchange, however, has been followed regu-
larly, notably in cases involving accrual of interest in the year inter-
est becomes legally due."' Perhaps the two cases can be reconciled
by focusing on the time the doubt as to collectibility arises. If the
seller obtains an unconditional right to future payments and at that
time reasonably expects the obligation to be paid, then he must
accrue the full amount. If, however, at the time of receipt of the
obligations there is sufficient doubt as to collectibility, then under
the Corn Exchange doctrine the taxpayer would not be required to
accrue any amount even though his right is unconditional.12 On the
other hand, if events follow which cast sufficient doubt on the col-
lectibility of payments, the correct method of accounting for such
events under the Spring City doctrine is through a proper deduc-
tion."3 In either case, the mere fact that there is a possibility that
the obligor will default in his obligation is not sufficient to defer
accrual of the income."' Where there is doubt as to collectibility
which is not sufficiently great to prevent accrual, the normal man-
ner of reflecting the doubt is through an addition to the reserve for
bad debts."5
Although doubtful collectibility may provide an exception to the
general rule of immediate accruability, it is unclear whether there
is a similar exception to the general rule that obligations must be
accrued at face value. The cases that purport to lay down this latter
rule"' seem to overlook the fact that section 1001117 makes no dis-
o Western Oaks Bldg. Corp., 49 T.C. 365 (1968); First Say. & Loan Ass'n, 40 T.C. 474
(1963).
- See generally Annot., 150 A.L.R. 754 (1944).
11 In Clifton Mfg. Co. v. Commissioner, 137 F.2d 290 (4th Cir. 1943), the Court of Appeals
for the Fourth Circuit, after citing both Spring City and Corn Exchange, stated that the
present decision was "in harmony with the principle of accrual accounting which regards the
right to receive, accompanied by collectibility, as the criterion." 137 F.2d at 292 (emphasis
added).
"' The Court in Spring City states "if such accounts receivable become uncollectible, in
whole or in part, the question is one of the deduction which may be taken according to the
applicable statute." 292 U.S. at 185 (emphasis added).
1' First Say. & Loan Ass'n, 40 T.C. 474, 478 (1963).
MERTENs, LAW OF FEDERAL INcOME TAXAnoN, § 12.75 (rev. ed. 1967).
"G See note 110 and accompanying text supra.
INT. REV. CODE OF 1954 § 1001.
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tinction between cash and accrual basis taxpayers. A literal applica-
tion of this section would allow accrual basis taxpayers to treat the
receipt of promises to pay as the receipt of "property (other than
money)" and report gain only to the extent of the fair market value
of the promises."' Possibly the cases have read the Supreme Court
decision in Spring City as an indication that since the two types of
accounting methods are to be distinguished, it would be improper
to interpret section 1001 in this manner. One case resolved the prob-
lem by stating:
An accrual basis taxpayer does not treat an unconditional right
to receive money as property received, but rather as money
received to the full extent of the face value of the right."'
If the foregoing cases are accepted as controlling, the accrual basis
taxpayer who receives installment obligations on the sale of prop-
erty will as a general rule be required to recognize immediate gain
to the extent of the full face amount of the obligations.' It should
make no difference that the obligations do not become due and
payable until some future date. An accrual basis taxpayer, accord-
ing to such an analysis, would be liable to pay tax on $10,000 even
though under the terms of the obligation, he has no right to receive
the cash for another ten years and even though he may be unable
to convert the obligation into $10,000 cash.
Thus it is difficult for an accrual basis taxpayer to argue that
under the "closed" method, he should only be required to accrue the
fair market value of any obligations he receives. It is also more
difficult for him to argue that the obligations have no fair market
value thereby affording him "open" treatment on a deferred pay-
ment sales transaction.
B. Deferred Payment Sales and the Accrual Basis Taxpayer
Regulation 1.453-6(a) provides as follows:
(1) In. . . sales of real property involving deferred payments
" It has been suggested that the early legislative history of the predecessor of section 1001
suggests a Congressional intent "to impose a uniform rule for the computation of gain or loss
on casual sales of personal property and all sales of real estate without regard to the taxpayer's
method of accounting, so that all 'obligations of the purchaser' would be valued for cash basis
and accrual basis taxpayers alike." Levin & Javaras, Receipt of Notes and Other Rights to
Future Payments by a Cash-Basis Taxpayer, 54 A.B.A.J. 405, 406 (1968).
"' First Say. & Loan Ass'n, 40 T.C. 474, 487 (1963).
110 Of course if the transaction qualifies for "installment method" treatment, the accrual
basis taxpayer also has that option available for reporting his gain. See note 21, supra,
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in which the payments received during the year of sale exceed
30 percent of the selling price, the obligations of the purchaser
received by the vendor are to be considered as an amount real-
ized to the extent of their fair market value ...
(2) If the obligations received by the vendor have no fair
market value, the payments in cash or other property having a
fair market value shall be applied against and reduce the basis
of the property sold and, if in excess of such basis, shall be
taxable to the extent of the excess. 2'
Paragraph one describes the appropriate tax consequences of a
"closed" transaction. Its importance lies in the fact that if it is
applicable to accrual basis taxpayers then the accrual taxpayer is
only required to recognize gain to the extent of the fair market value
of any obligations he receives. Paragraph two, on the other hand,
describes the availability of the "open" transaction method. The
phrase "no fair market value" should be interpreted to mean "no
ascertainable value."' 1 The regulation itself makes no distinction
between cash and accrual method taxpayers.
The question as to the applicability of this regulation to accrual
basis taxpayers was first raised in C. W. Titus, Inc. 2 In this case,
the taxpayer sold oil and gas leases under an executory contract
providing for payment of fifty percent of the sales price at the time
of the actual sale, a date which had not then been determined. The
balance of the payments due were to be made in the year following
the sale. The Board of Tax Appeals originally held that an accrual
basis taxpayer was required to report all income represented by the
face amount of deferred payment obligations, regardless of their fair
market value. The Board alternatively held that the taxpayer had
failed to establish any absence of fair market value.
On reconsideration, the Board held that an accrual basis taxpayer
has the right to report income on the basis of the deferred payment
method prescribed in the regulation. The issue then centered on the
question of the fair market value of the deferred payments involved.
Since the only evidence of the buyer's obligation to pay was con-
tained in an executory contract which, because of the undeter-
mined sales date, did not indicate when, if ever, the purchaser
would become bound to make payments, the Board further con-
2 Treas. Reg. § 1.453-6(a) (1958).
See note 12 supra.
' 33 B.T.A. 928 (1936).
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cluded that the promise to pay had no fair market value. The lack
of marketability of the contract was analyzed in terms of the seller's
inability to convert it into cash, seemingly an application of the old
"cash equivalency" standard. However, the decision also empha-
sized the conditional or contingent nature of the promise.
The essence of the Titus decision is that accrual basis taxpayers
may utilize the deferred payment method of reporting gain as pre-
scribed by the regulation. Titus, however, involved the applicability
of the regulation only insofar as "open" transactions are concerned.
The case does not answer the question of the extent to which an
accrual basis taxpayer must report gain in a "closed" transaction.
Furthermore, it is not clear whether this method is available only
in sales of realty as indicated by the regulation since the decision
did not clearly state whether the taxpayer had sold real or personal
property. Although subsequent cases have considered the applica-
bility of the regulation, the present status of the law in this area is
still unclear.
This lack of clarity in the law results mainly from the courts'
failure to analyze and apply precedent correctly. It also stems from
the fact that the major cases dealing with this question have in-
volved accrual basis taxpayers who were attempting to defer gain
by reporting on the "open" method. Thus their arguments have
been directed toward establishing either no fair market value or no
ascertainable fair market value for the obligations received and not
towards establishing that the fair market value was merely less than
face. Nonetheless, courts have readily found a fair market value of
face amount in cases involving the question of whether there was
any fair market value at all. 124
The problem is that if a court finds the taxpayer has not met his
burden of proving the obligation has a value of less than face, nei-
ther paragraph one nor two of the regulation applies. Hence some
courts have purportedly held that paragraph one does not apply to
an accrual method taxpayer where the taxpayer was arguing for
"open" treatment under paragraph two. In such a case the "hold-
ing"-that an accrual basis taxpayer may not rely on paragraph one
to value an obligation at fair market value rather than face-should
be regarded as dictum. Yet such dictum has been blindly followed
by other courts. The following discussion illustrates this lack of
judicial analysis and its concomitant contribution to the present
12, See, e.g., note 127 infra, and accompanying text.
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lack of clarity in the law.
1. Sales of Personal Property.-In George L. Castner Co.," the
taxpayer sold equipment and machinery in exchange for cash and
an interest-bearing note payable over a period of ten years. Cash
received in the year of sale exceeded thirty percent of the selling
price. Since this made the installment method unavailable to the
taxpayer, he argued that the deferred payment regulation as to
"open" treatment should be available to him, notwithstanding the
fact that the transaction in question was a sale of personal property.
The court rejected his argument and treated the transaction as
"closed."
The court noted that Titus purported to lay down the rule that
an accrual basis taxpayer might compute his gain on the sale of
personal property according to the method prescribed by the de-
ferred payment regulation. However, Titus was not deemed control-
ling since the Titus court had analyzed the transaction as a sale of
realty, indicating that any inclusion of personal property in the
conveyances to be made was purely incidental to the sale of the real
property interests in the oil and gas leases.128
The decision in Castner, however, did not turn on the applicabil-
ity of the regulation. The taxpayer claimed that the note had no fair
market value, and thus attempted to report gain on the open trans-
action method. However, the court found "that the evidence...
falls far short of any showing that the note had no fair market value
when received, and further, is neither persuasive nor convincing
that the value of the note was substantially, if any, less than face
"127
Subsequent courts appear to have been misled in their interpreta-
tion of Castner. Relying solely upon Castner for its case law author-
ity, the Sixth Circuit stated that "[tihe regulation [ 1.453-6(a)]
relied on by the taxpayers is applicable by its terms only to deferred
payment sales of real property, and has been held not to extend to
sales of personal property by the accrual basis taxpayer.""' In
George E. Freitas, '1 it was observed that "there is not authorization
in the statute [section 453] or the regulations for taxpayers on an
accrual basis to report gain from a casual sale of personal property
30 T.C. 1061 (1958).
'2 Id. at 1070.
" Id. at 1069.
'' Jones Lumber Co. v. Commissioner, 404 F.2d 764, 766 (6th Cir. 1968).
' 25 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 545 (1966).
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• . . on the deferred payment method. A taxpayer on the accrual
basis must either accrue the gain on the sale or report it on the
installment basis."'30 Again Castner was cited as authority for this
proposition.
Although the above cases ostensibly have settled the question of
the availability of the deferred payment regulation to accrual basis
taxpayers on a sale of personal property, the later decisions are
subject to attack on the basis of their interpretation of Castner.
Although Castner discussed the applicability of the regulation, the
decision should only be cited as authority for the proposition that,
absent sufficient evidence to the contrary, a note which bears inter-
est at a sufficient rate has a fair market value equal to its face
amount. None of the cases fully consider the rationale behind allow-
ing deferred payment treatment to accrual basis taxpayers only in
cases of real property transactions.' Nor do they consider the possi-
bility that authority for such tax treatment may be found some-
where outside Regulation 1.453-6(a)-in section 1001, for example.
2. Sales of Real Property.-The state of the law with regard to
the availability of the deferred payment regulation for sales of real
property by an accrual basis taxpayer is also unclear. Although the
regulation itself makes no distinction between cash and accrual
basis taxpayers, courts which have addressed themselves to this
issue have taken it upon themselves to draw a distinction. First
Savings & Loan Association,3 2 although not directly facing the
issue, stated in a footnote that since the taxpayer had not elected
to use the installment method, he was required to report the full
amount of gain in the year of sale.'3 The implication of this state-
ment raises another question as to the applicability of the regula-
tion. Since the language expressly refers to sales of real property "in
which payments received during the year of sale exceed thirty per-
cent of the selling price," the regulation might be interpreted as
being limited to those sales which do not qualify for installment
treatment. That is, mere failure to elect, when the installment
method is otherwise available, may not be sufficient for utilization
of the deferred payment treatment afforded in the regulation.
' Id. at 555.
" It has been suggested that the reason for the restriction may be that obligations to pay
for real property are usually for a greater amount of money and may remain outstanding for
a longer period. See Note, supra note 12, at 103.
40 T.C. 474 (1963).
Id. at 487 n.7.
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First Savings & Loan Association expressly stated that the ac-
crual basis taxpayer could not avail himself of section 1001 and
claim only the fair market value of the obligations as an amount
realized. However as with Castner, the ultimate reason for ruling
against the taxpayer was that he had failed to establish the obliga-
tions were worth any less than their face amount.
Despite the fact that First Savings & Loan Association did not
address itself directly to the issue of the applicability of Regulation
1.453-6(a) to accrual basis taxpayers, it was cited as authority for
the inapplicability of the regulation in Western Oaks Builders
Corp. Although the taxpayer in Western Oaks did not argue the
applicability of the regulation, the court stated that in sales of prop-
erty an accrual basis taxpayer must accrue the face amount of any
obligations received, rather than the fair market value. The court
itself pointed out the existence of the regulation and held it inap-
plicable to accrual basis taxpayers.
Western Oaks relies heavily on the Spring City analysis of accrual
basis accounting. Since the right to payment normally accrues at
the time of sale and since the right to payment is not in any way
dependent on the factors that may affect fair market value, reliance
on the Spring City analysis naturally tends to exclude the use of fair
market value for the accrual basis taxpayer. However Spring City
involved open accounts immediately due and payable, not accounts
represented by deferred payment obligations. Thus Spring City in
no way contradicts the proposition that Regulation 1.453-6(a) is
applicable to accrual basis taxpayers since it did not specifically
deal with that issue. The Western Oaks court should have limited
Spring City to its facts rather than relying on it for a broader propo-
sition.
IV. OPEN v. CLOSED AND FAir MARKET VALUE: FINAL ANALysis
A. Open Transactions
If a taxpayer qualifies for "open" treatment, it makes no differ-
ence whether he reports gain on the accrual method or the cash
method. The mechanics of the "open" method will be the same.
Payments received first reduce basis and after the basis has been
recovered, the remaining payments are reported entirely as gain.
The only consideration given to accounting methods is in the initial
13' 49 T.C. 365, 372 (1968).
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determination of whether "open" treatment is available. For cash
basis taxpayers, the determination is made on the basis of whether
any fair market value exists, or whether it is ascertainable, for the
deferred payment obligations he receives. This determination, in
turn, is based on the presence or absence of the relevant factors
discussed in Section II. As there pointed out, the determination may
be affected by which standard for realizing gain under section 1001
the court chooses to apply. If the court strictly adheres to the "cash
equivalency" standard, then absence of the liquidity-type factors or
the presence of significant contingencies may make it impossible for
the seller to convert an obligation into cash. Thus no gain would be
realized. Under the "fair market value" standard, there are several
possible arguments for concluding that there has been no real-
ization. First, if there is no possible market, then there is no objec-
tive source from which the amount realized-and therefore the
gain-can be derived. Second, the presence of substantial contin-
gencies will normally make "open" treatment available for the cash
basis taxpayer on the theory that the fair market value of the obliga-
tions cannot be ascertained. Third, an obligation subject to substan-
tial contingencies may not qualify as "other property" under sec-
tion 1001. That is, the contingencies may prevent the seller from
having enough of a vested right to future payment to classify the
promise as any kind of property at all.
Presence or absence of these factors or contingencies is not nor-
mally determinative of the tax liability of an accrual basis seller. A
bare right to future payment, regardless of whether that right has
any fair market value, is all that is generally necessary for him to
realize the gain represented by deferred payment obligations. But
the factors or contingencies which would make it impossible for the
cash basis taxpayer to estimate the amount of his gain would seem
to render an estimate of gain for the accrual basis taxpayer equally
speculative. For this reason there should be no distinction made
between accounting methods in transactions that involve deferred
payment sales. This is especially true in the case where "contingen-
cies" are involved. Under the Spring City analysis, it might be
argued that the contingency prevents the right from becoming
"fixed." Or the contingency may prevent the amount from becom-
ing "fixed"-another prerequisite for accrual.'1
However, it must be kept in mind that a payment which is merely
11 See Treas. Reg. § 1.446-1(c)(ii) (1957).
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contingent in form does not automatically result in "open" treat-
ment. The contingency must operate in a factual situation which
makes it impossible to estimate gain with any reasonable degree of
accuracy.
B. Closed Transactions
Once it has been determined that a fair market value exists, the
cash basis taxpayer must report gain according to the closed trans-
action method. The accrual basis taxpayer must do so once his right
to a specific amount becomes fixed. The question then be-
comes-should cash and accrual basis taxpayers be treated differ-
ently when receipt of a deferred payment obligation requires
"closed" treatment?
Regulation 1.453-6(a) (1) which prescribes the method of reporting
gain on a closed transaction makes no such distinction. However its
application may be limited to sales of realty, and then only to those
sales which do not qualify for installment treatment. The problems
presented by judicial interpretations of this regulation have already
been discussed. The real issue is whether there is any logical basis
for treating the two types of taxpayers differently in such a situa-
tion. That is, the question is-why should accrual basis taxpayers
be required to report income to the extent of the face value of obliga-
tions received, whereas cash basis taxpayers are required to report
income only to the extent of an obligation's fair market value?
The factor of "time to maturity" is a major consideration in ascer-
taining the present fair market value of any obligation. A discussion
of this factor will serve to point out the potential inequity of refusing
to allow the accrual basis taxpayer to report gain on receipt of a
promise to pay only to the extent of its fair market value.
If the note involved is accompanied by a sufficient interest rate,
the duration of the outstanding debt is not particularly significant.
Since a "sufficient interest rate" represents the amount of return
the note holder would be likely to earn were he to invest the money
elsewhere, the difference between present cash and future cash is
minimal. Furthermore, absent restrictions on transferability the
holder should be able to realize the face amount of the note immedi-
ately if he so wished. Receipt of such notes by cash or accrual basis
taxpayers should result in immediate recognition computed on the
basis of face value.
On the other hand, if the note bears no interest whatsoever, the
longer the time to maturity, the less the present value of the note
1973]
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will be. The discount factor will be directly related to, among other
things, present rates for the use of money. Time to maturity alone
could be said to reduce the value of a $1,000 marketable note due
in ten years, but bearing no interest, to approximately $500 since
$500 invested at seven percent today would increase to an invest-
ment of $1,000 in ten years time. If a cash basis seller were to receive
such a note, he would be required to report that receipt for tax
purposes as though he had received $500 cash. However under the
Spring City analysis, if he were an accrual basis seller, he would be
required to report the full $1,000 face value, because his right to that
amount is fixed.
The above example serves to isolate the single issue: Should an
accrual basis taxpayer be required to accrue an obligation at face
value if, for example, absence of an interest rate, coupled with a
distant maturity date, causes the obligation to be worth much less
than face? Normally an accrual basis taxpayer can account for the
discount reflected by an unsound obligor or other collectibility
doubts through an addition to his bad debt reserve. But is there any
comparable deduction for loss of interest on the outstanding debt?
It may be argued that section 483 will apply in such a case and that
on the basis of the imputed interest rules the accrual basis taxpayer
is only liable to accrue the present value of the obligation. This
raises several problems. Is he also liable to accrue the imputed
interest? Or may he defer accrual until the payment is made in year
ten? Or should he perhaps accrue an appropriate amount each year
as that amount is constructively earned by the passage of time?
Furthermore, section 483 does not apply to all deferred payment
transactions.'36 Nor was it enacted for the purpose of allowing ac-
crual basis taxpayers similar treatment to cash basis taxpayers.
There is, then, no specific provision for a deduction which reflects
loss of interest on an outstanding debt; and it is improbable that
the Commissioner would favor an "implied" deduction.
In such a situation there is simply no rationale for requiring the
accrual basis seller to accrue the face amount. Spring City should
be distinguished on its facts. Normally accrual basis taxpayers are
sellers of inventory property. Sales are made on open account and
receivables are due within a short time span. Although emphasis
has been placed on the fact that it is the time the right accrues that
'' It does not apply, for example, to sales in which the sales price is less than $3,000, nor
does it apply to sales of patents. Treas. Reg. § 1.483-2(b)(1966).
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is important and not the time the payment becomes due,'" a dis-
tinction should be made. The right to receive $1,000 immediately
or in the near future is inherently different from the right to receive
$1,000 in ten years time. The time the right accrues may be properly
determinative of the time when it is proper to accrue income. But
the time the payment becomes due may be determinative of the
amount that should be accrued.
There is no sound basis for treating cash and accrual basis tax-
payers any differently in such a sitution. The accounting method
employed by the taxpayer is normally determinative of the year in
which income is to be reported.13 The method need not also be
determinative of the amount of taxable gain a taxpayer is required
to report. Neither section 1001 of the Revenue Code nor Regulation
1.453-6(a) distinguishes between cash and accrual basis taxpayers.
Both are explicit authority for valuing promises to pay at fair mar-
ket value. If the facts warrant assigning a particular promise a value
of less than face, then the facts should be further analyzed before
applying the rigid rule requiring accrual basis taxpayers to accrue
at face value. Doubt as to collectibility may be offset through the
bad debt reserve. However, time to maturity and an insufficient
interest rate may not be. If these are the factors which reduce the
value of the promise to an amount less than face, the foregoing
analysis supports the proposition that it is this lower value which
should be accrued.
V. CONCLUSION
"Deferred payment sales" is but one area in which questions arise
as to the taxation of promises to pay. It is an area which appears to
have created different tax consequences for cash and accrual basis
sellers. There are many factors which have contributed to this dis-
tinction and it has been suggested that perhaps this distinction is
not always justified. Inconsistencies have arisen because courts have
been inclined to apply rigid rules without analyzing the bases for
their application and without considering the context out of which
particular rules have arisen. The most apparent confusion stems
from a blind application of the Spring City doctrine to all accrual
basis taxpayers. It is possible that deferred payment sales create an
exception to normal tax accounting procedures. Since regulation
' See, e.g., Commissioner v. Hansen, 360 U.S. 446, 464 (1959).
See Treas. Reg. § 1.446-1(c) (1957).
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1.453-6(a) is the only specific reference to deferred payment sales
and since it makes no distinction between cash and accrual meth-
ods, perhaps it should be interpreted as indicative that deferred
payment sales create identical tax liability for both types of taxpay-
ers.
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